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Abstract
An agent can choose to forego benets from side opportunities and to instead provide
benets to the principal. In return, the principal o¤ers rewards. If this exchange
is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. This
model allows the agents productivity in contractible and possibly also non-contractible
actions inside the relationship to be correlated with productivity in side activities.
This arguably realistic assumption yields several novel implications for the feasibility
of relational contracts and for agent selection by principals. The analysis reveals, for
example, that optimal agent productivity is often non-monotonic in the importance,
to the principal, of ensuring agent reliability.
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1 Introduction
Relations are the lifeblood of organizations. Cooperative behavior can often only be sus-
tained in repeated relationships (Axelrod 1984). Relations can also foster attachment to
organizations, thus facilitating the voice option rather than the exit option for the members
of the organization which can be particularly important in times of crisis (Hirschman 1971).
More generally, relations often help achieve outcomes that are otherwise not available due
to high transaction costs.
One way in which economists have successfully modeled relations is through self-enforcing
(relational) contracts. Seminal contributions have established conditions for the feasibility
of stationary relational contracts (Bull 1987, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Levin 2003).
Models of self-enforcing contracts have been fruitfully employed to analyze relations both
within organizations (e.g., Rayo (2007)) and between (e.g., Doornik (2006)), and to study
the implications of the interaction between formal contracts and informal agreements for
rm boundaries (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1994, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002).
Recent important extensions of the basic theory have allowed for privately observed e¤ort and
output (MacLeod 2003, Fuchs 2007), privately observed costs of making promised payments
(Englmaier and Segal 2012, Li and Matouschek 2012), unobservable value of the relationship
(Halac 2012), limited liability (Fong and Li 2012), as well as non-stationarity of contracts
(Yang 2009, Thomas and Worrall 2010) and the building of relationships (Chassang 2010).
This paper starts from the traditional framework of stationary contracts with observable
e¤ort and output, but introduces a feature of many real-world situations that has hitherto
not been explicitly analyzed. In particular, economic models of relational contracts typically
abstract away from the possibility that an agents productivity in tasks inside the relationship
both in those tasks that are the focus of the self-enforcing contract and in those that are
contractible may be correlated with his side opportunities. This paper allows for this
possibility and shows that it can have important implications for agent selection and for
relations.
To develop the analysis, consider an organization, for example, a consultancy, where a
(female) manager (the principal, M) and a (male) worker (the agent, W) produce output.
M chooses Ws competence, that is, M selects W. The more competent W is, the more
contractible output he produces; he writes better reports for the clients of the consultancy.
Ws competence is a characteristic (not Ws action). W regularly needs to decide whether
to bear personal (opportunity) costs for the principal. To x terminology, let us say that
W acts reliably when he is willing to bear personal costs to benet M. (It is convenient to
have a single short-cut for referring to this behavior throughout this paper. Other terms
could be used, depending on the specic application this model is adapted to. Only in some
settings is "e¤ort" a natural interpretation of a reliable action.) Thus, reliability is an
optimally chosen behavior, not a given trait. W acts independently when he instead chooses
to obtain private benets, perhaps by voting for his preferred option or by not participating
in the vote and pursuing matters of private interest or by using a meeting with a client
to establish some personal business relationships. More competent agents have more such
opportunities for private benets, that is, typically there is a positive correlation between
inside and outside productivity. The extent to which Ws competence a¤ects the value for
M of Ws reliability depends on the context. In some cases, such as when reliability means
voting for Ms proposal in a group meeting or lauding Ms abilities in a client meeting, Ws
competence is irrelevant for the value that M derives from Ws reliability. In other cases, a
more competent Wwill produce greater reliability benets for M than a less competent W.W
is willing to behave reliably and forego his side opportunities only if he receives appropriate
rewards from M. Rarely will M and W be able to write a binding contract about all aspects
of allegiance and its rewards. Rather, important parts of reliability and its results are usually
non-contractible, requiring repeated interaction to sustain it.
The analysis shows rst that the feasibility of reliability tends to be limited if a highly
competent W requires too costly rewards for reliability (due to his better outside options
on the reneging path) but if the value W creates for M through his reliability does not vary
much with his competence. In this case, M may have too strong an incentive to renege on
promised reliability rewards. Thus, a tradeo¤between competence and reliability arises.The
model implies that a more competent W has endogenously higher costs of reliable actions in
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this case (in contrast to a standard e¢ ciency wage setting where cost of e¤ort is decreasing
in competence). If, by contrast, Ws competence increases the value of his reliability to M
su¢ ciently strongly, this creates enough opportunities for M to reward W for reliability. In
sum, if the surplus dened by the spread between the value of reliability to M net of the cost
of reliability to W, adjusted for discounting, falls too fast with Ws competence, a relational
contract cannot be sustained even with a highly competent W.
The model next yields empirical predictions for the optimal level of competence from
Ms perspective. Existing work on relational contracts does of course recognize that higher
outside options make relations more di¢ cult. But because the existing literature on self-
enforcement does not allow for correlations between inside and outside productivity, taken
literally, these models make the counter-factual prediction that it is optimal to pick the
counterparty with the lowest possible reservation utility as the partner for interaction.
In the present framework, the empirical predictions instead naturally depend on the way
competence a¤ects the value of reliability. The most interesting comparative statics arise
for the case where a tradeo¤ between reliability and competence exists. Competence is
always (weakly) lower under reliability than under independence. On the one hand, M
may willingly sacrice some worker competence in order to secure reliable behavior. On the
other hand, reliability need not be optimal because it may require M to give up too much
worker competence. Thus, even where reliability is feasible and has net positive value for the
manager, the manager may prefer a more competent worker with whom she keeps repeating
the statically optimal equilibrium of the reliability game. In particular, independence and,
thus, maximal competence is optimal when reliability is not so important to the principal.
Notably, however, in the range where reliability is optimal, when M values reliability
more, she will actually increase Ws competence. This surprising result occurs because with
a higher valuation of reliability M can more credibly promise rewards. Overall, therefore,
there arises a non-monotonic relationship between the value of reliability to the principal
and optimal agent competence. While other model classes presumably can also generate
such non-monotonicities under some conditions, the contribution here is to show that where
a relational contracts model is seen as appropriate to study a given setting, the correlation of
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inside and outside productivity can yield an outcome that does not occur in the absence of
this correlation. In particular, this nding can be compared with the prediction available, by
analogy, from other work that contains a version of the notion that access to outside options
a¤ects the feasibility of relational contracts. Specically, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
(2002) show that asset ownership has an e¤ect on the feasibility of relational contracts
between rms. To see the relation between and the di¤erent implications of Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy (2002) and the present paper, note that non-integration between an upstream
(supplier) and downstream (buyer) rm enhances the upstream partys "competence" in the
sense that it can work on its outside options more e¤ectively than it can under integration.
In Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002), where reliable delivery of the product from the
upstream party to the downstream party is important, integration is more likely. Because
that framework naturally considers only two levels of "competence" (integration and non-
integration), it suggests a monotonic relationship between the value of ensuring reliable
delivery and competence in terms of asset ownership. The present paper shows that this
intuition does not extend to the case of continuous degrees of competence.
Finally, this paper also shows that independence and reliability can be signals of com-
petence (to an uninformed outside market) made e¤ective by the di¤erent marginal costs of
reliability that agents of di¤ering competence levels face.
Besides contributing to the literature on relational contracts, the paper also is related
to some other work. First, the general idea that participation constraints can be type-
dependent was analyzed by Jullien (2000) for the case of explicit contracts; here, relational
(implicit) contracts are the focus. Second, many papers assume that agents di¤er in their
preferences for taking into consideration the preferences of the partner (for example, Aghion
and Tirole (1997) and Fehr and Falk (2002)). Here, by contrast, the costs of acting to the
benet of others is endogenously determined by competence. Third, some studies consider
the case where principals care about both economic and social competence, broadly dened,
of their counterparts, but focus on di¤erent issues than the present one. For example, reliable
employees are yes-men,but in contrast to Prendergast (1993), the present model does not
entail an informational story. Firm-specic capital (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 1995)
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need not make a worker more reliable; when internal opportunities for applying the high rm-
specic knowledge arise, such a worker may be quite disloyal to his boss, by, for example,
taking a job in another division. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) emphasize how investment
in human capital can make an agent unattractive for a social group. There are two main
novel aspects of the present analysis. First, even though competence matters also to the
production for M, M may willingly forego worker competence. Second, reliability here is a
matter of choice that is endogenously determined by competence.
Finally, other model frameworks that do not use relational contracts also yield the pre-
diction that principals may hire less than fully competent workers. For example, Prendergast
and Topel (1996) show that a principal who values the power to a¤ect his agents welfare
may prefer less competent agents; Glazer (2002) presents a static model of rent-division that
focuses on the optimal mix of internal and external rent-seeking abilities; Friebel and Raith
(2004) argue that a manager may fear competent subordinates because they may wish to
take his post; and Egorov and Sonin (2011) use a static model with asymmetric informa-
tion to demonstrate that the higher the stakes are for dictators, the more they may favor
incompetent viziers who are more "loyal" (a term that could be used to describe the agents
behavior also in the present model). These models do not allow the worker to choose to
be reliable, they do not allow for the managers attempts to foster reliability, and they have
di¤erent implications and empirical predictions. In the political economy context, some ev-
idence (see Section 4) exists that is in line with the relational contracts frameworks unique
prediction that, where reliability is optimal, when M needs more reliability, she will in fact
be able to and prefer to hire more competent workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and Section 3 analyzes
it. Sections 4 and 5 discuss applications. Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 Model setup
The model considers the interaction between a manager (M) and a worker (W). Both the
manager and the worker are risk-neutral and innitely-lived with common discount factor
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 2 (0; 1). Risk aversion is not necessary to create a potentially benecial role for the
relation, and so it is excluded. The workers characteristic is his competence level,  2 [0; 1]:
The manager chooses the workers competence. A natural interpretation of this assumption
is that M hires exactly one W. W can take exactly one job. We can also think of M as
choosing Ws training, which is assumed to have a xed cost. Over the course of the game,
Ws competence stays xed. M has all the bargaining power.
Basic payo¤s. M is the residual claimant of output. In each period, W produces output
y with probability  and y with probability (1  ) ; where y = y y>0.1 This output is
contractible. As a model short-cut, the output ows solely from competence. M pays a spot
wage w to W, as discussed below. Thus, for a given ;Ms expected payo¤before calculating
benets and costs of reliability is Ey w =y+y w: Similarly, Ws payo¤ in the absence
of reliability is w.
Ms gains from Ws reliability. The manager can, in each period, realize an additional
potential gain (or avoided loss) v () > 0; where v is commonly known and commonly
observed when it accrues to M. Assume that v0 ()  0:
However, allowing M to obtain v () requires W to bear some personal costs. These costs
of cooperation are here modeled as foregoing the side opportunities b ().
Ws side opportunities. In each period, a side opportunity of value b () > 0 arises.
Assume b0 () > 0. That is, more competent individuals have better and more side opportu-
nities. If W chooses to pursue this opportunity, he acts independently. If W does not use the
side opportunity, he acts reliably. Throughout, everybody can observe whether the worker is
reliable. The fact that W has to bear costs in order for M to realize the gains from reliability
is a dening characteristic of reliability. Reliability has positive social (joint) value when
v () > b () :
The side opportunities can take many forms. For example, a highly competent employee
1Alternatively, this assumption can be interpreted as saying that W produces, with a xed amount of
time (normalized to 1),  units of high-quality output and (1  ) of low-quality output.
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of a software company may engage in consulting activities; an employee of a regulatory
agency can give a presentation on his eld of expertise at a conference of professionals.
The wage w and expected private benets b () are additively separable in the workers
utility function. It does not directly harm M when W uses his side opportunity.
The model uses a simple, reduced form of the various roles of competence. A richer
framework would endogenize v () and b () ; though this would come at the cost of additional
complexity.
Is reliability a kind of e¤ort? One might think of Ws decision as his e¤ort choice.
This is a valid interpretation as W and M are in an agency relationship. However, the
equilibrium costs of e¤ort for W will be determined by Ms choice of Ws competence level
and the ensuing strategic interaction with M. This will ultimately yield di¤erent predictions
for how the cost of e¤ort depends on competence than is implicit in a standard e¢ ciency-
wage model. In the light of these di¤erent results, a di¤erent term than "e¤ort" seems
appropriate.
Rewards for reliability. The manager needs to o¤er the worker something in exchange
for bearing personal costs. The most direct way to accomplish this is for the manager to pay
the worker for reliability, and this is the case the analysis focuses on. The monetized value
of this reward say that of a company car, or invitations to basketball games is given by
x  0; and is a choice variable for M. It is assumed to be stationary for reasons discussed
later. It is also commonly observed.
Ws reservation utility. Ws reservation utility is assumed to be:
u () = y + (1  ) y + : (1)
The rst part of this formula, y + (1  ) y; is Ws expected productivity. One way to
rationalize the assumption that in alternative employment W receives this amount is to posit
that Ws alternative job opportunity is self-employment, where neither reliability nor side
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opportunities are relevant.2 The assumption that b () does not play a role in Ws reservation
utility will imply that M can economize on base wages. It is, in essence, a short-cut to obtain
the (intuitive) baseline result that there are benets for M to get a high-competence worker
if he is a¤ordable.
In the second part of equation (1), the parameter  < 0 measures the marginal product
of Ws competence in this alternative employment relative to when he works for M ; thus, 
says something about the quality of the match between M and W. The analysis here focuses
on the case where  < 0: A negative  indicates that M has a relative advantage at using
Ws competence in the contractible part of production, that is M is relatively productive.
This is the interesting case; after all, if M were less productive than the market, an obvious
reason to hire a less competent W is that highly competent Ws are too expensive because
others are willing to pay them more. Note that the assumption  < 0 makes no statement
about the marginal impact of competence on side opportunities or on the value of reliability.
(Results for  > 0 are available on request.)
A break-up of the relationship is in principle costless. However, Ms reservation utility is
assumed to be su¢ ciently low to make the M-W match attractive for M, and it is always in
Ms interest to hire W, if just for "spot interaction" (dened below).
Summary. Each period, M and W face a game characterized by the stage game payo¤s
given in Table 1, where payo¤s in each cell are in the format UM ; UW . (The timing of moves
is discussed below.)
Table 1: Payo¤matrix in the reliability game
W acts reliably W acts independently
M rewards Ey + v ()  [w + x] ; w + x Ey   [w + x] ; w + b () + x
M does not reward Ey + v ()  [w] ; w Ey   [w] ; w + b ()
2It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full competitive labor market equilibrium model in
which M may also enter relational contracts in other rms.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Statically optimal behavior (spot interaction)
For future reference, dene spot interaction as the equilibrium that arises out of statically
optimal behavior by the players. When M and W cannot contract on reliability, this would
be the only equilibrium that arises if indeed M and W were meeting for only one round.3
In this equilibrium, M does not pay for reliability (x = 0), and it is thus optimal for W to
act independently, which in turn rationalizes Ms strategy. Anticipating this equilibrium, M
chooses the optimal competence level by solving
max

UM = y + y   w (2)
s:t: UW = w + b ()  u ()
The constraint states that inside utility, given by wages plus the expected value of side
opportunities, must, on average, be no less than reservation utility. To minimize wage costs,
M will o¤er a spot wage
w = u ()  b () ; (3)
i.e., she will make Ws participation constraint bind, where she can benet from the fact
that highly competent workers can engage in more side opportunities. Simplifying (2) by
using the denition of u () = y + (1  ) y + ; Ms problem is equivalent to
max

b ()  : (4)
Because  < 0,  = 1 is optimal, leading to a payo¤ of b (1)  :
3The reference to this equilibrium as having spot characteristics is meant to distinguish it from a
relational equilibrium which requires long-term interactions. The literature sometimes uses the terminology
of no trade(MacLeod and Malcomson 1998) for the notion of statically optimal behavior.
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3.2 Contractible reliability
As a benchmark for the following analysis, consider now a (hypothetical) scenario where
reliability and the rewards for reliability are not only observable, but veriable as well.
Thus, reliability is contractible. Because the manager proposes the contract, she can simply
ask for reliability and o¤er to pay the worker an amount xc each period, where the index c
denotes the contractible case. These reliability costs add to the wage bill: Thus, assuming
for the moment that M indeed wants to induce reliability, in order to identify the optimal
competence level, the manager maximizes
max

UM = y + y + v ()  (w + xc) (5)
s:t: UW = w + xc  u () :
Naturally, we have xc = b () each period.4 The constraint indicates that inside utility,
given by wages plus rewards for reliability, must, on average, be no less than reservation
utility. To minimize wage costs, M will again o¤er w = u ()  b () : Thus, we see that the
managers objective is to
max

  + v () : (6)
Because  < 0; maximal competence  = 1 is optimal, leading to a payo¤ of v (1)  :
Comparing the payo¤s under contractible reliability (v (1)   ) and spot interaction
(b (1)  ), we have the intuitive
Proposition 1 When reliability is contractible and has positive social (joint) value, the
manager prefers it to the equilibrium that arises out of statically optimal behavior (spot
interaction).
A contractible reliability (static multi-tasking, contractible e¤ort) model with positive
correlation between inside and outside productivity therefore holds no predictions for the
optimal level of competence except those stemming from comparative technology advantages
4This is equivalent to paying the expected present value of side opportunities to W up front.
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(which translate into wage savings). This situation changes drastically when we relax the
assumption that reliability is contractible.
3.3 Noncontractible reliability
In many cases, neither allegiance nor rewards for reliability can be proven in a courtroom.
Reliability is non-veriable and, thus, non-contractible. In this case, Table 1 shows that
reliability cannot be sustained in the one-shot game. Because   0; Ey  0; w  0; x  0;
and b ()  0; the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is spot interaction. Indeed,
note that the game is similar to an asymmetric Prisoners Dilemma. Repeated interaction
is required to open up the possibility for M and W to obtain the reliability outcome: The
crucial di¤erence of this analysis from a standard repeated Prisoners Dilemma is that M
can choose which amount x to o¤er and with whom to play the game.
As regards timing, we need to ask whether M can take v (), but not pay x; and whether
W can take x, but still do b () : That is, can the parties deviate from the reliability with
rewards contract and still obtain the other sides cooperative contribution? In many practical
situations, much like in the standard Prisoners Dilemma used to analyze many types of social
interactions, the answer to this question is yes. Even when M and W do not literally move
simultaneously, this is the correct assumption to make when they do not learn the other
partys move until later in the period, as seems plausible in many real-world circumstances.
Alternative assumptions are conceivable in some situations, and the analysis below also
explores the implications of such alternative assumptions. For example, in some cases it is
possible for M to pay a conditional bonus for Ws acting reliably in the same period. The
latter assumption is typically used when the focus of the analysis is on the incentive scheme
that M can use to induce non-contractible e¤ort ("pay for performance"). Essentially, this
assumption amounts to making reliability contractible for one party and thus assuming that
W has no commitment problem. (In this case then, M captures all the surplus. In the
presently analyzed main case, by contrast, M needs to leave some surplus to W.) Results
below will show that as long as M has a commitment problem (that is, as long as M cannot
denitively promise to reward reliability after it has been delivered), a tradeo¤ between
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reliability and competence will still arise even if W can commit to reliability.
3.3.1 Non-reneging constraints and the feasibility of reliability
This section presents the conditions for reliability with rewards to be an equilibrium sup-
ported by trigger strategies. As is typical in the literature on repeated games, the analysis
here focuses on the equilibrium that arises only under repeated play, but does not answer
the question when this is a likely outcome. Specically, consider self-enforcing (relational)
reliability with rewards contracts. We concentrate on stationary contracts of the following
form: W promises to be reliable to the manager. The manager promises to pay x in each
period. Any one-time deviation by any player results in both players exerting the statically
optimal behavior in all future periods.5
For the worker, honoring the promise of reliability means foregoing b () ; but obtaining
x in addition to the basic wage w in each period, thus obtaining
w + x+

1   (w + x) (7)
in total welfare. By deviating today, W obtains extra utility b () today but su¤ers a reduc-
tion to the reservation utility going forward (which comes from spot interaction forever, or,
equivalently for him, a break-up of the relationship). Thus, by deviating today, W obtains
w + b () + x+

1   (u ()) (8)
in total welfare. Recall that u () is equal to w + b () :6
5It is assumed that M does not hire a new W (with a possibly di¤erent competence level). Abreu (1988)
showed that if cooperation is attainable in a repeated game, it is without loss of generality to concentrate on
the worst punishment path. As shown above, spot interaction yields the same utility for the worker as if no
relationship is formed, making it the worst punishment path. The approach here has become the standard
approach for the analysis of self-enforcing contracts and has been used both in methodological research (Bull
(1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Levin (2003)) and in applications such as Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy (2002). There would be state-varying payments if the outside wage were also state-varying (Thomas
and Worrall 1988). For recent work on non-stationarity contracts (due to limited liability or other frictions)
see, for example, Thomas and Worrall (2010) and Yang (2009).
6M does not take away Ws side opportunities on the reneging path. To see why this makes sense, recall
that M saves spot wages through this she has to convey utility u () to W either way. If M could take
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Therefore, combining (7) and (8), the workers non-reneging constraint (NR-W) is
w + x+

1   (w + x)  w + b () + x+

1   (w + b ()) : (9)
We next see that the spot wage (the xed component of the remuneration) drops out.7
Simplifying yields
x  b () : (10)
In other words, the required reliability rewards are the expected value of side opportunities
scaled up by the inverse of the discount factor. Let
~x () = b () = (11)
denote the minimal rewards that induce reliability from type :
In addition, the relational contract that M o¤ers must also satisfy Ws participation
constraint
w + x  u () : (12)
But any worker who is in spot interaction with M earns w = u ()   b () : M would not
pay a higher base wage to a reliable worker but would use the loyalty rewards x as a bonus.
Plugging in, (12) becomes u ()   b () + x  u () ; which simplies to the participation
constraint
x  b () : (13)
Because the self-enforcing contract needs to create surplus for the reliable worker, (13) is
implied by (10), Ws non-reneging constraint. That is:
Lemma 1 Whenever the workers non-reneging constraint is fullled, his participation con-
straint is also satised.
away Ws side opportunities and pay him less, spot interaction would cease to be the worst punishment
path, inconsistent with the standard modeling approach.
7That the wage is a transfer and drops out from the non-reneging constraint is a fact common to models
of relational contracts with additively separable xed and bonus components of remuneration. The same
occurs, for example, in MacLeod and Malcomson (1998).
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Thus, in principle, every worker can be induced to be reliable as long as the rewards
x are high enough. But that is precisely the constraint the manager faces. The higher
the promised x, the higher is the temptation to renege on the contract. For some realized
output today, Ms non-reneging constraint requires that obtaining reliability benets v ()
net of reliability rewards x in each period is preferred to receiving reliability today without
paying for it, but never receiving nor paying for reliability in the future. Therefore, the
managers non-reneging constraint (NR-M) is
y + v ()  x  w + 
1   [Ey + v ()  x  w]  y + v ()  w +

1   [Ey   w] (14)
which collapses to
x  v () : (15)
In other words, the maximum credible reliability rewards are the value of reliability to the
manager scaled down by the discount factor.
The manager will set x as small as possible, but she needs to take into consideration
that NR-W is still fullled. When the parameter values are such that both constraints can
hold, there are (innitely) many divisions of the surplus that work (see Theorem 1 in Levin
(2003)). Even without taking a stance on the division of this surplus, however, we can see
that whether reliability dictates less than full competence and whether reliability is feasible
at all depends on the shape of the two critical functions, b () and v ().
Formally, Proposition 2 summarizes the results by combining the two non-reneging con-
straints. The Corrolary follows from the fact that contractible reliability is desirable when
v () > b () :
Proposition 2 (Feasibility of reliability with rewards) Reliability is feasible at some
given competence level R if
b
 
R

v
 
R
  2: (16)
Corollary 1 Non-contractible reliability may not be feasible, even when reliability would be
desired if it were contractible.
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This is a simple and intuitive set of results. Reliability can only be obtained where M can
credibly threaten W with severe punishments if he is not reliable. One key determinant of
Ms punishment ability is Ws competence, and how competence a¤ects side opportunities
and inside value generated through reliability. Note that Ms relative productivity  has
no implications for the feasibility of reliability (although it will have implications for its
desirability).
To develop intuition further, Figure 1 depicts the situation graphically, using examples
of di¤erent assumptions about b () and v () in the di¤erent panels. (The Figure plots v ()
concavely and b () linearly, although this is not by any means a required condition for the
model to apply. Also, the Figure is not a taxonomy of all possible cases.)
Figure 1: The feasibility of reliability. Competence  can be 1 at most, but for comparison across
the panels, it is instructive to see the shape of the non-reneging constraints extend over a broader
range. NR-W is the workers non-reneging constraint: Only reliability rewards above this line are
su¢ cient for the worker to behave reliably. NR-M is the managers non-reneging constraint: Only
reliability rewards below this line can be credibly promised. The shaded area shows the feasible
set. The Figure shows four examples, not a taxonomy. (The text discusses all cases.) A tradeo¤
between reliability and competence arises in the case of Panel A. Reliability is feasible for all
competence levels in Panels B. Reliability is feasible only above a certain competence level in
Panel C, and for no competence level in Panel D.
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Panel A in Figure 1 depicts one arguably plausible benchmark case. Here, incompetent
workers create more value through reliability than they have outside options (v (0)  >
b (0) =). And although the value of reliability is greater the more competent the worker
is (v0 > 0); the value of outside options increases su¢ ciently fast so that the two non-
reneging constraints cross at some  < 1: Reliability is only feasible in the shaded region,
i.e., only for those agents with su¢ ciently low levels of competence. If the value of reliability
increases faster and/or side opportunities increase more slowly and/or the surplus generated
by reliability of those with a zero competence level is high enough, full competence may
be compatible with reliability (see Panel B). If reliability is infeasible for incompetent
workers because they have relatively good outside options, reliability may be feasible for
only su¢ ciently high levels of competence (Panel C) or no competence levels (Panel D).
Thus, even at high competence levels, reliability may be feasible if the value added created
through increases in competence is su¢ ciently large. On the other hand, a tradeo¤ between
reliability and competence is likely to arise if incompetent agents produce su¢ cient value
of reliability and if competence matters more outside than inside, taking discounting into
account (b0=2 > v0).
This also implies that there can be a tradeo¤ between reliability and competence that M
needs to optimize on. If the maximum R for which condition (16) holds is less than unity,
M must choose whether to hire a fully competent W who will not behave reliably, or W who
will act reliably, but who is less competent. The next subsection analyzes this tradeo¤ and
the resulting comparative statics for the optimal competence level.
3.3.2 The optimal competence level
When implementing reliability, M chooses Ws optimal competence by maximizing his ex-
pected utility, Ey+ v () x w; subject to the constraint that reliability must be feasible.
Recall that w = Ey +    b (). From equation (11), the loyalty rewards that M will pay
are x = b () =: Plugging in, Ms optimization problem therefore is
max

f () =   + b () + v ()  b ()

(17)
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s:t:
b()
v()
 2;
with  between 0 and 1. Allowing b () and v () to take on completely arbitrary shapes
complicates further analytical statements tremendously; a little bit of structure, drawing
on commonly used functional forms, helps clarify matters. In particular, suppose that
the reliability value produced by competence follows a concave, power utility/production
function with a shift term, v() = (1 + ) + V; where V > 0, 0 <  < 1: Also, suppose that
b() =  +B, where B > 0;  > 0: These functional forms are fairly common.
To understand Ms choice, it is helpful to note the conditions when she would like to
maximize worker competence. If   > 1 

, then f 0() =
    1 



+ (1 + ) 1 > 0
8 > 0: Intuitively, when Ms productivity advantage (as measured by  ) is about as big
as the marginal product that Ws competence has for the search for side opportunities (as
measured by ), then the principals objective function is monotonically increasing in Ws
competence (when  is greater than one-half). As  increases (as players get more patient),
even when M has a smaller relative productivity advantage (a smaller ) orWs competence
gives rise to many additional side opportunities (a larger ), M would like to hire the most
competent worker possible. Therefore, this case is quite likely to occur and is, therefore,
the main case of interest studied here. (See below for a treatment of other cases.)
Case 1: There is an upper bound on the level of competence compatible with
reliability. In the concrete setting, this case arises when V + 1  B
2
, i.e., when incompe-
tent workers add more reliability value than they have in terms of side opportunities, even
adjusted for discounting. (Feasibility of reliability also implies social e¢ ciency.) Moreover,
the interesting case occurs when there exists an intersection point of b () with v () in [0; 1]:
This is the case of panel A in Figure 1.
Here, we obtain the following result and comparative statics:
Proposition 3 Suppose that there is an upper bound on the level of competence compatible
with reliability and suppose that f 0() > 0. The optimal R has to fulll 
2
R (1+R) =
V   B
2
: For su¢ ciently small changes of ; B; ; V; and  such that all assumptions are
satised, we obtain that: The optimal level of competence compatible with reliability is higher,
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the more patient the manager and the worker are, the worse side opportunities are, the less
side opportunities vary with worker competence, the more important reliability is, and the
faster the value of reliability increases with competence. That is, @
R
@
> 0; @
R
@B
< 0;
@R
@
< 0; @
R
@V
> 0; @
R
@
> 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is intuitive that as patience () increases, R increases. As is well-known from the Folk-
Theorems, more patient individuals are less likely to renege on their promise or, conversely,
the temptation b () weighs comparatively less. We would, therefore, expect project-based
organizations which have a shorter time horizon to have di¢ culties in acquiring competent
and reliable partners for projects.8
Next, environments where greater competence a¤ords signicantly better side opportu-
nities for W (higher ) or which hold better side opportunities for any level of competence
(higher B) tend to bring about a tradeo¤ between competence and reliability. In a small
alpine village, hiring the most competent person does not cause great concerns for lack of
reliability, whereas in New York City the tradeo¤ between competence and reliability should
be more pronounced.9
Finally, note that as the degree by which competence makes reliability more valuable
rises ( increases) or as reliability itself simply becomes more important (V increases), even
non-contractible reliability can allow full competence. One might think that the tradeo¤
between competence and reliability implies that where reliability is more important (i.e.,
where v () is larger), there will be less competence. But in fact, the opposite is true in a
sense. The reason is that as the value of reliability increases, the manager can now more
credibly promise reliability rewards. This result has important implications for the choice
of optimal competence, to which the analysis turns next.
To make statements about the overall optimal level of competence, we can compare the
welfare that M obtains in reliability, f(R); with the welfare from optimally solving the spot
8However, there may be recurring projects. For example, although the lm industry is very much char-
acterized by projects, reliability plays a role because the players expect to meet again.
9A related result is that of Ramey and Watson (2001) who nd that a fall in market friction, as reected
by a rise in the probability of locating a new trading partner in the matching market, makes less onerous
the threat of severing an existing trading relationship, thereby tightening the e¤ort constraint.
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interaction problem,  + b(1): The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4 Suppose that there is an upper bound on the level of competence compatible
with reliability. The manager prefers reliability (with less than full competence) to spot
interaction (with full competence) if the optimal level of competence compatible with reliability
is high enough. (The threshold level of competence compatible with reliability is derived in
the Appendix.)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 2 There is a non-monotonic relationship between observed equilibrium compe-
tence and the factors that drive the optimal competence in reliability.
To see this, note rst that competence in reliability is always at most as high as in spot
interaction. Second, some di¤erences between the variables need to be considered that
determine how the details work out. The marginal productivity of competence for the value
of reliability () and the value of reliability that incompetent workers generate (V ) only
a¤ect the principals welfare if she does, indeed, implement reliability. Consider a case
where M and W interact in spot interaction. An increase in the value of reliability (either 
or V ) increases the level of competence compatible with reliability. This may make reliability
the preferred outcome, in which case optimal competence suddenly falls. Within reliability
equilibrium behavior, however, further increases in the value of reliability enhance optimal
compentence (see Proposition 3), overall yielding a non-monotonic relationship between the
value of reliability and the level of agent competence the principal prefers.
These comparative statics distinguish this model from existing work. In the relational
contracts model of Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002), when reliable delivery by the up-
stream party of a good to the downstream party becomes more important, making the
upstream party more "competent" by way of non-integration (that is, giving it a better
outside option) becomes less attractive. In contrast to asset ownership, competence is by
nature continuous, allowing for the richer comparative statics.10
10Of course, this is not to say that a relational contracts model is needed to obtain a non-monotonic
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Conversely, starting in reliability, an overall higher level of side opportunities, B, reduces
the feasible (and, within a range, optimal) competence level, makes reliability less preferred,
and ultimately leads the principal to switch to independence with maximal competence,
again yielding a non-monotonic relationship overall. For the extent to which side oppor-
tunities for the worker depend on worker competence, , the result is similar but further
complicated by the fact that both the threshold for reliability to be optimal (formally de-
rived in the Appendix) and R itself depend on : On the one hand, if  increases, spot
interaction becomes more attractive. The optimal level of competence under reliability also
decreases, making reliability less attractive. On the other hand, M saves more in wages for
each given competence level. Therefore, M may, in fact, be more likely to implement relia-
bility. Interestingly, therefore, the model implies that reliability inside companies does not
necessarily have to decrease if W can use his competence in more ways in side opportunities.
Similarly, while greater patience of the players (higher ) allows a higher level of competence
to be compatible with reliability, the present value of reliability reward costs also increases,
making it possible for spot interaction to become more attractive as  increases.
Finally, greater productivity of M ( ) leads M to more likely implement spot interaction
and to hire the most competent worker.
For an additional perspective on the results, denote the net value of reliability for a given
type by v ()  ~x () : This denition does not take into account Ms non-reneging constraint.
In other words, even if there is a positive net value of reliability, M may not necessarily be
able to implement it. However, when reliability is feasible, we know that it has positive net
value, i.e., v
 
R
  ~x  R = v ()  b  R = > 0: Therefore, we have the intuitive
Corollary 3 Even when reliability is feasible and has positive net value, the manager may
prefer spot interaction with a more competent worker.
relationship between optimal agent competence and the value of reliability to the principal. The focus here
is on what the implications of the correlation between inside and outside opportunities are, given that the
relational contracts model is the framework of interest. Having said that, the model does yield di¤erent
imlications than some static models that study a tradeo¤ between loyalty and competence of the agent. For
example, in the static model of Egorov and Sonin (2011), the more important the loyalty of the vizier, the
more the dictator is inclined to choose an incompetent vizier.
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Case 2: There is a lower bound on the level of competence compatible with
reliability. This is the case of panel C in Figure 1. This case arises when B  V +1 (that
is, incompetent Ws have side opportunities that have greater value than what reliability is
worth to M, i.e., reliability is socially ine¢ cient) and when there exists a unique intersection
point of the two lines in [0; 1] which is in (0; 1): We immediately have:
Proposition 5 Suppose that there is a lower bound on the level of competence compatible
with reliability. The manager will always choose a maximally competent worker under re-
liability, R = 1: That is, for su¢ ciently small changes of ; B; ; V; and  such that all
assumptions are satised, @
R
@
= 0; @
R
@B
= 0; @
R
@
= 0; @
R
@V
= 0; @
R
@
= 0:
Even though it is optimal for M to have a maximally competent worker, equilibrium
behavior of the worker will depend on the parameters. Specically, M prefers to implement
reliability rather than spot interaction if
f(1) =  + 2 + V   1  

( +B) >  + b(1) =  +  +B: (18)
Not surprisingly, the higher V and ; the more likely it is that f(1) >   + b(1); making
reliability the preferred strategy; and the higher B and ; the more likely it is that spot
interaction is the preferred outcome.
Other cases. The other cases in Figure 1 are straightforward, but do not yield interesting
comparative statics. First, when b () and v () do not cross in [0; 1] as in panel B, maximal
competence is both feasible and optimal (and reliability is always desired). Second, if
reliability is infeasible for any competence level, as in panel D, M will always implement
spot interaction with maximal competence.
There are also cases not covered in Figure 1. For example, when b () and v () cross twice
in [0; 1], competence may be infeasible up to a certain competence level and above another
competence level, but feasible in the intermediate range. When Ms objective is increasing
in Ws competence, this case is similar to case 1 discussed above. If the principals welfare is
not monotonically increasing in competence, then three cases need to be distinguished, see
Proposition A.1 in the Appendix.
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3.3.3 A useful special case with an explicit solution
Consider the case when the value created through reliability does not vary with competence,
i.e., where v () = v. In a majority of cases, one would have to view this as an unrealistic
assumption. However, from this case further interesting results can be obtained that make
it worthwhile paying the price of lack of realism.11
To simplify matters further, assume that b () = b: (Equivalently, the outside options
are such that in each period, a side opportunity of value b > 0 arises for W with , so that
the expected value of side opportunities in each period is b:) To ensure that M does not
want to hire a W of negative competence, assume that 
2
1   bv . These assumptions together
describe the case of a constant value of reliability.
Proposition 6 Consider the case of a constant value of reliability. Reliability is feasible if
and only if
  1  b  
2v
b
= R: (19)
Even when reliability is feasible and has positive net value, the manager may prefer spot
interaction with a more competent worker. The more productive the manager is (i.e., (b  )
is large) or the tighter the bound on the feasibility of reliability in terms of the allowed
competence levels is (i.e.,
 
1  R is large), the more valuable reliability must be to the
manager in order to be preferred over spot interaction, where full competence is feasible. The
empirical predictions parallel those of the general model.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this case, therefore, a tradeo¤between reliability and competence is inevitable. Recall
that this result is derived assuming that both M and W have a commitment problem in the
sense that the move of M (W) is not seen by W (M) before M (W) makes a decision.
However:
11Although the assumption that v is constant is strong, this case may approximately cover two scenarios.
First, an act of reliability may literally involve attending a vote and/or casting the right vote in a democratic
decision process, e.g., a committee or a board in an organization, rather than taking care of Ws own business.
(This neglects that the value of Ws vote will depend on the votes of others.) Second, Ws decision may be
approving a project, the authority over which M has delegated to W (and where the principal does not
immediately break up the relationship in case of violation of the principals wishes).
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Proposition 7 Consider the case of a constant value of reliability. A necessary and su¢ -
cient condition for the tradeo¤ between reliability and competence to arise is that the manager
cannot commit to reward the worker for reliability.
Proof. See the Appendix.
A lack of commitment is a necessary condition for the trade-o¤ to exist even in the
general case. (If M could commit, the contract would be explicit and reliability could always
be achieved.) What the Proposition says is that even when we make stronger assumptions
that in principle make the tradeo¤ likely (in particular, when v does not increase in ), there
will not be a tradeo¤ if M is not tempted to renege on her promise, but if he is tempted,
then this is su¢ cient for the trade-o¤ to arise even if W has no commitment problem. This
is important in that some managers or organizations may be able to develop a reputation
for rewarding reliability, and may thus not be constrained by a non-reneging temptation on
their part.
4 Applications and evidence
The basic model insight relevant for many real-world situations is that a relational contracts
model with a positive correlation of inside and outside productivities tends to yield a trade-o¤
between reliability and competence.12 Conditional on a relational contracts model being the
appropriate model framework for a given setting,13 allowing for the correlation is attractive
12In principle, one needs to determine which of the cases discussed in the model analysis applies on a
case-by-base basis. By and large, it seems plausible that the tradeo¤ can arise within organizations. For
example, a more competent computer expert at an internet company may be more apt at applying his
superior knowledge to the particular tasks at hand, and the value generated for his manager by reliable
acts may also be greater. However, his side opportunities probably increase much more strongly with his
competence than the value of reliability inside the relationship. Not only can he engage in other similar
programming tasks, but knowing how to program in a computer language is a universally applicable tool.
Thus, even this relatively specic skill makes side opportunities grow much faster with competence than
inside contributions do. The expert can also do general consulting about the software business. Note that
this is a statement about the relative marginal productivities of competence in the non-contractible parts
of production, v () and b () : We may well have  < 0 at the same time; which holds that in terms of the
contractible parts, the match between M and W makes better use of Ws competence than Ws alternative
employment.
13As discussed in the introduction, other model frameworks can also generate the prediction that managers
may not wish to hire the most competent employee.
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because the present framework implies that the principal will not choose the person with
the least valuable side opportunities (as she does in the absence of the correlation), but will
balance the concern for relations against the concern for productivity.
Generally speaking, signicant evidence exists that is consistent with the models overall
message, but, as we will see, few direct tests of unique predictions of the model are yet
available. The available empirical evidence regarding the model comes in three parts.
First, more competent individuals in fact tend to behave less reliably. For example,
Williams (1996) discusses the problems managers face with very intelligent software devel-
opers who are less easily induced to follow their managers plans. Moreover, studies in
organizational behavior have found that those with many outside options (an important
determinant of which is competence) are less likely to act loyally and to contribute organi-
zational citizenship behavior (Bergeron 2007, Lawler and Yoon 1996, Podsako¤, MacKenzie,
Paine, and Bachrach 2000).
Second, principals recognize the trade-o¤ in practice. The management literature rou-
tinely points to the practice of managers hiring less than fully competent workers to ensure
reliability (Sample 2003). Samuel Goldwyn famously stated: "Ill take 50% e¢ ciency, if
I can get 100% loyalty." Consistent with this view, Larry Ellisons hiring practices for his
senior executives at Oracle and Richard Auhulls choices of allies for Circon (Hall, Rose, and
Subramanian 2001) have been interpreted as favoring reliability over competence. Also,
chairmen of boards, when they "move up" from the CEOs chair, do not always choose the
most competent CEO as their successor but seek to appoint a loyal individual.14 Managers
also frequently do not choose the most competent advisors because they fear they will be
less reliable. For example, Joni (2004) describes the case of a regional vice president who
was worried that his subordinates knew the territory and the players too well and feared
they would exploit that knowledge for their own purposes(p. 87). Examples abound also
in political economy; reliability of executives in public agencies is valued highly. Even in the
14Conversely, a simple version of the model was applied in Wagner (2011) to investigate why CEOs may
not desire the most competent board members (though this simpler model does not allow for several features
shown to be important in the more general framework here, such as the non-monotonicity of optimal agent
competence).
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US and other developed countries, many agency executives are selected in order to serve
the political needs of the president, and these may or may not involve policy considerations
(Wilson 1989, p. 198). The presidential appointment process is frequently regarded as be-
ing strongly dominated by the tradeo¤ between competence and reliability (Edwards 2001),
sometimes leading to amateur government(Cohen 1998). Similarly, Heclo (1977) observed
that many of [the agencys executives] selectors [are] more interested in the process of get-
ting their way than in the executives eventual output(p. 99).
Third, while a model of relational contracts that takes into account the impact of pro-
ductivity provides one way to organize management and political folklore into a coherent
picture, the cited evidence does not in fact constitute a test of the more specic features of
the present model. Indeed, limited evidence of this sort is currently available. The model
predicts that (in the range where reliability is optimal) rms with a higher discount factor
will hire more competent workers. To the extent that larger (more mature and older) rms
have a higher discount factor, the model is thus one possible explanation for the stylized fact
of the positive correlation between rm size and wage level. (Of course, there are also other
explanations, such as a larger impact of worker skill on output in larg rms compared to small
rms.) Wagner (2010) empirically considers the cross-section of competence levels in public
agencies. The analysis reveals that recruitment into public agencies is more meritocratic and
more focused on competence in countries where (1) agency o¢ cials have poorer outside op-
tions (for example, because they have few private sector contacts), (2) careers in agencies are
expected to be longer-lasting, and (3) agencies are more powerful (and, thus, their reliability
arguably more important). To the extent that the observed agency-government relations
capture reliability with rewards equilibria, this evidence is consistent with Propositions 3 and
6. By contrast, nding (3) in particular is not consistent with alternative theories, such as
Egorov and Sonin (2011). While the Wagner (2010) study appears to be the only empirical
analysis available that tests some of the relational contracts frameworks implications, it also
does not test the prediction regarding the non-monotonic relationship between importance
of reliability and agent competence as it assumes that the agencies and governments are
playing according to an implicit reliability contract. A full test of the present theory would
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require data covering both reliability equilibria and spot interactions. Future research can
hopefully make progress on such a test.
5 Extension: Signaling with reliability
We have so far assumed perfect and symmetric information. In reality, the manager or the
market may not know a workers competence with the same precision as he does. This
section makes a rst step towards extending the model to include the possibility that agents
signal their competence through independence or reliability, and it suggests that this model
framework may help explain some stylized facts regarding labor markets.
To model this situation, for tractability, consider the simplied model with a constant
value of reliability. Suppose that M has one worker who can be of two di¤erent types, High
and Low, with levels of competence 0<L  H < 1: Begin by assuming that M knows the
workers type, but the market does not know which type the worker is. The manager chooses
the wages she o¤ers to the high and low types, respectively, wH ; wL and reliability rewards
x:15
At the beginning of each period, conditional on the history of play, the market updates
its belief (starting from some prior) about the workers competence. Consider the simplest
case, where in the rst period an opportunity of value b arises for sure, and the market
knows this. Thus, the market learns whether W behaved independently or reliably. This
implies that if the market believes that only Lows behave reliably, separation occurs either
immediately or never. It is assumed that the market does not observe wages or output levels.
This is a strong assumption; it is an extreme version of the perhaps palpable notion that the
market is more likely to observe external actions than company-internal variables.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, given the markets beliefs and the managers wages
and rewards schedule, both worker types nd it optimal to act according to the markets
belief. Given the markets beliefs and the workersbehavior, the manager nds it optimal
to o¤er reliability rewards and wages consistent with beliefs and behavior.
15In principle, the manager can o¤er two rewards levels, xH and xL, but in the equilibrium we consider,
it will turn out to be optimal to induce only L to reliability.
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Analysis If M wants less competent workers to behave reliabily, the potential problem is
that if the markets rewards for independence are too tempting, low-competence workers will
try to mimic high-competence workers. Begin by assuming that even when M knows the
worker is Low, in order to keep him inside the rm, she would need to o¤er a wage corre-
sponding to Highs wage forever if W acts independently. Despite this strong assumption,
separation is nonetheless potentially possible in equilibrium. The tradeo¤ between compe-
tence and reliability provides for an endogenous sorting condition: reliability is less attractive
for High than for Low. In other words, the implicit costs of reliability instead of no reliability
are higher for High than for Low.
Employing these insights, and recognizing that reliability payments also need to cover the
wage di¤erential an independently behaving worker can obtain, we can state the following
result for the basic signaling game   (; b; v; Y; fH ; Lg) with the following features: (1) An
opportunity of value b appears for certain at the beginning of the game. (2) The market
values reliability less than M and  = 0. (3) Assume y > b and H   L > 1  : (4) Lows
reliability has positive net value under perfect information (i.e., v   ~x (L) > 0) and Highs
reliability has negative net value under perfect information (i.e., v   ~x (H) < 0).
Proposition 8 Consider the basic signaling game. There exists a separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that is characterized by the following features:
1) The market believes that H acts independently and that L acts reliably. The two types
behave accordingly:
2) The reliability rewards x and wages wH ; wL satisfy the following conditions:
a) High is at least as well o¤ as Low. That is: wH + Hb  wL + x.
b) Low does not want to be independent. That is: wL + x > wH + Lb:
c) High exactly receives his reservation utility. That is: wH + Hb = u (H) :
d) Low earns a surplus over his reservation utility. That is: wL + x > u (L) :
(3) The manager never does better than if the market has symmetric information.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In other words, whenever M wants to separate types under perfect information, she
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can do so under asymmetric information (as long as the types are su¢ ciently di¤erent and
su¢ ciently patient), but at additional costs. Note that the characterization of wages and
reliability rewards in part (2) allows for a range of equilibria. This multiplicity of equilibria
is not due to a problem of specifying beliefs on an o¤-equilibrium path, but due to the fact
that wages and reliability payments, wL + x; are essentially perfect substitutes in inducing
Low to reliability.16
Discussion Four comments on these results are in order. First, we had assumed that Low
is able to secure wH forever by being independent. This similarity between Low and High
is arguably too extreme. To the extent that Low can only achieve a lower wage, separation
between types is easier.
Second, recall that Proposition 8 is valid for the case where other rms care less about
reliability than M. If the opposite is true, Low has less incentive to mimic High. The reason
is that signaling high competence now is in fact a bad signal - no one wants to appear
overqualied.
Third, what if M does not know Ws competence either? Even in this case, we can show
that the same logic applies, i.e., that M may use the sorting possibility presented to her in
the form of the reliability-competence tradeo¤ to her advantage.
Proposition 8Under the conditions of Proposition 8, a separating equilibrium with the
properties of the equilibrium in Proposition 8 exists also in the case where the manager is
asymmetrically informed about the workers competence.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Fourth, these results can be compared with Fryer (2007). In his paper, highly talented
agents in a community do not invest in group-specic capital, while less talented individuals
do invest in su¢ cient amounts in order to signal that they would like to engage in cooperative
behavior with the target group. In his analysis, thus, a signal is conveyed through an
16Each type has exactly one behavior to exhibit in equilibrium and there are only two possible behaviors.
Therefore, no specication of o¤-equilibrium beliefs is necessary. Thus, this equilibrium is also sequential
(Kreps and Wilson 1982). As before, the reason for treating wages and reliability rewards separately is that
M can only renege on reliability rewards.
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investment before a cooperation game is played. In the present paper, the reliability-
competence tradeo¤ gives rise to an endogenous screening condition, i.e., those who show
independent behavior today while playing the game are inferred to be competent and thus
predicted to behave independently in the future.
Evidence Because the case of a constant v is a limiting case of the more general instance
v = v () ; it appears likely that the results derived here also hold in a broader range of
circumstances. To the extent that they do, they may help to inform a new interpretation
of otherwise puzzling pieces of evidence from labor markets.
One implication of the model is that M cannot cut wages and reliability rewards for
reliable workers too much. By ratcheting and o¤ering too low a wage for the reliable
worker, the manager risks that the worker is tempted too much by the ability to get the higher
wage that must be o¤ered to independently behaving workers. Thus, when we interpret wages
and reliability rewards together and assume that when the manager has a choice she will pay
out most of the sum in wages, not in informal reliability rewards, the model suggests one
possible avenue towards a resolution to the puzzle that managers are generally reluctant to
lower wages in the face of a decline in a workers reservation wage.17
Second, the model can speak to the wage e¤ects of mobility. The standard approach to
analyze these e¤ects is in terms of adverse selection. In particular, Greenwald (1986) shows
that in this case workers who change jobs are marked by being part of an inferior group
of competence (see also Spence (1973), McCormick (1990), and Gibbons and Katz (1991)).
Light and McGarry (1998) and Munasinghe and Sigman (2004) indeed nd that previous
mobility is negatively related to wages and positively related to future turnover. But the
explanatory variable they employ is total separations. Instead, the present model predicts
that voluntary and involuntary separations have di¤erent e¤ects. Voluntary separation tends
to signal higher competence. Consistent with this prediction, Keith (1993) shows that once
17The literature frequently explains the fact that there is little ratcheting by moral reasons. Bewley
(1999) points to motivators having to do with generosity(p. 431). MacLeod (2001) suggests that it can
be explained by the threat of less e¤ort by a worker whose wage is cut. The model here suggests a specic
meaning for this claim, e¤ort here being the honoring of a relational contract. Another explanation, also
derived in a relational contracts model, stems from models where there are privately-known shocks to the
opportunity costs of making promised payments (Englmaier and Segal 2012, Li and Matouschek 2012).
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these two forms of mobility are disaggregated, a history of more frequent voluntary quits
increases (log) wages, while a history of involuntary mobility decreases wages.18
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the theory of relational contracts. The methodological innovation
is to incorporate a correlation between inside and outside productivities into the analysis.
Several assumptions were necessary to obtain a set of tractable results; future work may be
able to relax these assumptions (e.g., the exogenous assumption of how competence a¤ects
inside and outside productivity; or some of the functional form assumptions). To the extent
that a relaxation of these assumptions retains the key intuition of the model framework, the
substantive contribution of the analysis is to reveal that in many situations reliability, i.e., a
relational contract that requires the agent to choose costly actions that benet the principal
in return for non-contractible rewards, may not be feasible for highly competent workers. The
stronger and surprising result is that even when reliability is feasible and has positive social
value, it may be dominated by spot interaction with more competent individuals. Contrary
to what initial intuition might suggest, the principals optimal choice of agent competence
exhibits non-monotonicities with respect to various parameters of interest. For example,
starting from a case where the agent behaves independently, as the value of reliability to the
principal increases, optimal agent competence will rst, at some point, fall (to achieve the
now attractive reliability equilibrium) and then rise again (because the principal can more
credibly promise rewards when reliability is more important to her). Moreover, the paper
shows that reliable behavior can be a signal of low competence. However, when the value
generated by reliability increases su¢ ciently strongly with competence, the tradeo¤need not
arise, nor will it when the manager can otherwise credibly promise rewards. Importantly,
the theoretical and empirical implications of this paper arise only from the introduction of
18See Mincer (1986), Keith and McWilliams (1995), and Keith and McWilliams (1999) for further evidence
on the e¤ectiveness of employed job search. Models of turnover do not easily yield predictions about wage
behavior (see Burdett (1978), Weiss (1984), where wage e¤ects arise from mobility costs, Jovanovic (1979a),
and others). Human capital theory predicts a negative relationship between job mobility and investments
in job specic skills (Becker 1975, Jovanovic 1979b).
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a positive correlation between inside and outside productivities into a framework of self-
enforcing contracts; they are neither a feature of a static multi-tasking world (where a
correlation between inside and outside productivities was seen to hold no predictions for
the preferred competence levels) nor of the standard relational contract framework (where
the prediction of existing theories simply is that contracts are most easily sustained with
individuals who have low reservation utilities). This observation suggests that models of this
sort could more broadly contribute to the analysis of settings where both production and
relations matter for organizational success.19
19Besides addressing issues in labor markets and inter-rm relationships, the theory could be employed in
the analysis of marriage (Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977) and of activities that demand a high degree of
loyalty to the organization, such as churches or sects (Iannaccone 1992, Berman 2003).
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Supplementary Appendix
Proposition 3 Suppose that there is an upper bound on the level of competence compatible
with reliability and suppose that f 0() > 0. The optimal R has to fulll 
2
R (1+R) =
V   B
2
: For su¢ ciently small changes of ; B; ; V; and  such that all assumptions are
satised, we obtain that: The optimal level of competence compatible with reliability is higher,
the more patient the manager and the worker are, the worse side opportunities are, the less
side opportunities vary with worker competence, the more important reliability is, and the
faster the value of reliability increases with competence. That is, @
R
@
> 0; @
R
@B
< 0;
@R
@
< 0; @
R
@V
> 0; @
R
@
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 3
It is helpful to dene the following sets: A := f : b()
v()
 2g and B := [0; 1] \ A:
Additionally, to simplify notation, we dene the linear function l() := 1
2
( +B): Then,
B = f 2 [0; 1] : v()  l()g (20)
Note that B is connected or empty since l () and v () have zero, one or two intersection
points between 0 and 1: In all three cases, the set of s with l()  v() is connected or
empty in [0; 1] because v is strictly concave and hence, there is at most one region with
v() > l():
We also need the following denitions. Denote with R the optimal level of competence
under reliability:
R := argmaxx2Bf(x) if B 6= ; and argmaxx2Bf(x) exists, (21)
q := maxB; (22)
s := minB: (23)
When Ms objective function is increasing in Ws competence, the optimal level of compe-
tence is the maximal level of competence compatible with reliability, q:
In the present case, B 6= ;: Per the assumption that Ms welfare is increasing in Ws
competence, R = q: As seen in panel A, the function v () crosses l() from above, and
only competence levels lower than the intersection point are compatible with reliability.
Since R = q; The optimal R has to fulll the equation l(R) = v(R); i.e.,

2
R   (1 + R) = V   B
2
: (24)
Since v is strictly concave, l is linear, v(0) = V + 1  B
2
= l(0) and there exists an
intersection point of the two curves at R; we have that v0(R) < l0(R): If  increases;
then v increases and the intersection point R shifts to the right. If we increase ; then l
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increases and the intersection point R shifts to the left. A similar logic applies to the other
parameters.
Note that the Proposition holds independently of the assumption that the objective func-
tion is increasing in worker competence for the parameters ; ; : Because of the assumption
V + 1  B
2
; s = 0: f may have a maximum in B: Then, R = p: 1. If we increase ; then
p increases. Second, if we increase ; then p decreases. These two facts follow from the
formula of p and the restriction R = p 2 (0; 1): R can either be p or q (depending on
p 2 B or p > q).
Proposition 4 Suppose that there is an upper bound on the level of competence compatible
with reliability. The manager prefers reliability (with less than full competence) to spot
interaction (with full competence) if the optimal level of competence compatible with reliability
is high enough.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proposition simply follows from the fact that Ms objective function is monotonically
increasing in Ws competence. To explicitly derive the threshold level of competence, note
that reliability (with competence R) is preferred to spot interaction (with full competence)
if
f(R) =  R + (1 + R) + V   1  

(R +B) >  + b(1) =  +  +B: (25)
Plugging in from equation (24) for the optimal R we have, after rearranging,
f(R) =  R + R

1
2
  1  


| {z }
>1
+B

1
2
  1  


| {z }
>1
: (26)
Thus, M prefers an agent with less than full competence to a highly competent one, if
R >
 +  +B   1
2
+ 1


 +    1
2
  1 

 (27)
and vice versa. Note that if   < B <  +1
2
  1

; the threshold for R is in (0; 1):
Proposition A.1 If   < 1 

; f 0() < 0 8 > p := argmaxx2[0;1)f(x): Note that p =
+ 1 



 1
 1   1: Then, three cases need to be distinguished: (1) If the function f has a
maximum in B; we can use the formula R = p =

+ 1 



 1
 1   1 in order to nd that
@R
@
> 0; @
R
@B
= 0; @
R
@
< 0; @
R
@V
= 0; @
R
@
> 0: (2) If argmaxx2[0;1)f(x) < s; then 
R = s
and we obtain @
R
@
= 0; @
R
@B
> 0; @
R
@
> 0; @
R
@V
< 0; @
R
@
< 0 with the same reasoning
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as in the case with V + 1  B
2
: (3) If argmaxx2[0;1)f(x) > q; then 
R = q = 1 and we get
@R
@
= 0; @
R
@B
= 0; @
R
@
= 0; @
R
@V
= 0; @
R
@
= 0:
Proposition 6 Consider the case of a constant value of reliability. Reliability is feasible if
and only if
  1  b  
2v
b
: (28)
Even when reliability is feasible and has positive net value, the manager may prefer spot
interaction with a more competent worker. The more productive the manager is (i.e., (b  )
is large) or the tighter the bound on the feasibility of reliability in terms of the allowed
competence levels is (i.e.,
 
1  R is large), the more valuable reliability must be to the
manager in order to be preferred over spot interaction, where full competence is feasible. The
empirical predictions parallel those of the general model.
Proof of Proposition 6
The non-reneging constraints are very similar as before. In a state where the side
opportunity of value b actually arises, the workers non-reneging constraint (NR-W) is20
w + x+

1   (w + x)  w + b+ x+

1   (w + b) : (29)
Simplifying yields
x  b

  b (1  ) = b+ b1  

: (30)
In other words, the required reliability rewards are the expected value of side opportunities
plus some extra amount that decreases with the discount factor and increases with the value
of b: Let ~x () = b+ b1 

denote the minimal rewards that induce reliability from type .
The managers non-reneging constraint is
y + v   x  w + 
1   [Ey + v   x  w]  y + v   w +

1   [Ey   w] (31)
or
x  v: (32)
By combining the non-reneging constraints, we obtain the proposition.
Denote with R = 1  b 2v
b
the maximal level of competence compatible with reliability.
Full competence is only compatible with reliability if the gains to reliability su¢ ciently
outweigh the value of side opportunities, i.e., if v > b=2; which corresponds to the condition
in Proposition 2. The results for spot interaction and contractible reliability translate
directly to this case. In both instances, it can be easily seen that maximal competence is
optimal.
Now consider the optimal choice of M. Because M is relatively productive, it is optimal
for M to choose the maximal competence level compatible with reliability, R = 1  b 2v
b
:
20Note that the non-reneging constraint when no opportunity arises is implied by NR-W.
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From this one can show that the parallel result of Proposition 5, namely that: Even when
reliability is feasible and has positive net value, the manager may prefer spot interaction
with a more competent worker. This result is not simply due to the fact that reliabilitys
absolute cost increases with competence. Instead, it arises because higher competence can
be achieved in spot interaction than in reliability.
Specically, the payo¤ for M under reliability then is
URM
 
R

= ERy   w
 
R

+ v   x  R =(33)
ERy   ERy   R+ Rb+ v   Rb  b
1  

= v   b1  

  R:
Plugging in R = 1  b 2v
b
=  v
b
  1 

; we get
URM
 
R

= v   b1  

  v
b
+
1  

 = (34)
v

1  
b

  (b  ) 1  

= v

1  
b

  b  

+ b  :
Compare this payo¤ to the one obtainable under spot interaction. There, we know that
 = 1 is optimal, leading to a payo¤ of
USM ( = 1) = b  : (35)
Therefore,
URM
 
R

> USM ( = 1), v

1  
b

>
b  

(36)
or
v > b
b  
b  2 = v^ (b; ; ) : (37)
We can easily verify that v^ (b; ; ) > b; i.e., that b 
b 2 > 1 as  < 0:
21
We can also rewrite the condition that reliability is preferred to spot interaction as
v   b1  

  R > b   (38)
v   b1  

  Rb > b  Rb  + R (39)
v   x  R > (b  )  1  R = (b  )  b  2v
b
> 0 (40)
21We can also check that as  goes to unity, the area where L < 1 is required vanishes and gets squeezed
outbetween the v = b=2 and v^ (b; ; ) schedules. Another way to look at the v^ (b; ; ) schedule is to ask
what happens to competence as we move up the graph and to the right along v^ (b; ; ) : It is easy to check
that L decreases, as indicated by the arrows along v^ (b; ; ) in the Figure. Along v^ (b; ; ) ; as b goes to
innity, L approaches 2  1 :
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where the inequality follows from the premise b   2v > 0: Thus, reliability needs to have
strictly positive net value; merely surpassing zero by some small amount " is not enough.
Recall that the contractible reliability (static multi-tasking) model prescribes full compe-
tence and reliability whenever reliability has positive social value, v > b: Figure A.1 describes
the di¤erent implications that arise for the case of noncontractibility.
Value of side opportunities: b
M’s gains from reliability: v
v=b
v=b/d
2
)(ˆbv
Reliability and
full competence
also under
noncontractible
reliability
Reliability is dominated by full competence in both
the contractible and noncontractible cases
When reliability is
contractible, it is preferred.
When reliability is not
contractible, the loss in
competence required to
make reliability feasible is
too great.
q decreases
Reliability is possible and preferred,
but decreased competence is required
I II
III
IV
Figure A.1: The tradeo¤ between competence and reliability and its dependence on Ms gains
from reliability and Ws opportunity cost of reliability. The graph approximately assumes
 = 0:75;  =  0:4; and plots b between 0 and 3.
The graph has four relevant regions. Begin on the top left of the graph. In region I, we
have b   2v < 0, i.e., we are to the left and above of the v = b=2 line. The expression
for R tells us that we can obtain full competence and reliability: This is preferred to full
competence alone.
As b   2v turns positive, we enter region II. As we move down and to the right of the
graph (as b increases relative to v), R must become smaller than unity. At some point, the
losses in competence required to still obtain reliability become too great, and M is better o¤
not trying to obtain reliability, but focus instead on full competence under spot interaction.
We saw above that v^ (b; ; ) = b b 
b 2 is the minimum level of reliability gains required to
make reliability desired for given other parameter values.
Below v^ (b; ; ), in region III of the graph in Figure A.1, full competence is preferred
because the optimal choice of competence in order to retain reliability is unattractively low.
There are two interesting sub-regions, though. Far below v^ (b; ; ) ; namely, where v < b
(in region IV), competence dominates reliability also under contractible reliability. However,
between the 45-degree line and v^ (b; ; ), if M could contract on reliability, she would be
better o¤doing so. But non-contractible reliability forces her to give up too much competence
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and thus induces her to forego reliability. This area thus shows the losses due to the need
for a self-enforcing reliability contract.
From the above, we know that for M to prefer reliability with competence R to spot
interaction with competence S = 1, we must have v x  R > (b  )  1  R > 0: Thus,
the more productive M is (i.e., (b  ) is large) or the tighter the bound on the feasibility
of reliability in terms of the allowed competence levels is (i.e.,
 
1  R is large), the more
valuable reliability must be to M in order to be preferred over spot interaction, where full
competence is feasible.
The empirical predictions parallel those of the general model. Specically, the more
productive M is (  is larger), the more likely he is to implement spot interaction, which
is associated with (weakly) higher reliability than any reliability equilibrium. A lower value
of side opportunities, b; a higher discount factor, ; and a higher value of reliability to the
manager, v; all increase the maximum level of competence compatible with reliability, R.
When reliability is optimal, these comparative statics also hold for the level of competence
we expect to observe in equilibrium. The model also has predictions for two interaction
terms: The interaction between side opportunities and length of expected interaction reduces
competence, while the interaction between the value of reliability and length of expected
interaction increases competence. Mathematically, this can be seen from the cross-derivatives
of R: Intuitively, the logic behind these two predictions is the following. When the duration
of interaction is longer, competence is, ceteris paribus, higher. On the other hand, as side
opportunities become greater, the deviation temptation becomes greater, decreasing optimal
competence. Thus, with a long duration of interaction, the detrimental e¤ect of an increase
in side opportunities is bigger than if competence is already relatively small (which is the
case when the duration of interaction is short). The opposite holds for the value of reliability.
Proposition 7 Consider the case of a constant value of reliability. A necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the tradeo¤ between reliability and competence to arise is that the manager
cannot commit to reward the worker for reliability.
Proof of Proposition 7
For su¢ ciency, suppose that Ms non-reneging constraint, x  v, remains valid, while
instead of Ws non-reneging constraint, only Ws participation constraint, x  b, needs to
hold. That is, M o¤ers pay for performance, but cannot commit to deliver this promised pay.
Combining these two constraints, the upper bound on the level of competence compatible
with reliability when M is tempted, ML ; is
ML = 
v
b
= 1  b  v
b
: (41)
In this case, reliability is preferred to spot interaction if
v   ML  > b  ; (42)
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or
v > b
b  
b   = v^ (b; ; ) : (43)
This implies the same comparative statics as for the main case.
For necessity, suppose that only W has a commitment problem while M can commit
to pay an "e¢ ciency wage" before Ws action. Thus, the two relevant constraints are Ws
non-reneging constraint, x  b + b1 

; and the a¤ordability constraint that v  x: From
these two constraints, the upper bound on the level of competence compatible with reliability
when W is tempted, WL ; is
WL = 1 
b  v
b
: (44)
Thus, reliability is preferred to spot interaction if
v   b1  

  WL  > b  ; (45)
or
v >
b

(46)
Now, if indeed v = b

; then WL = 1: In other words, when reliability is preferred, this also
implies that, in fact, full competence is possible. Therefore, no tradeo¤ between reliability
and competence exists for Ms optimal choice in this instance.
Proposition 8 Consider the basic signaling game. There exists a separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that is characterized by the following features:
1) The market believes that H is independent and that L is reliable. The two types behave
accordingly:
2) The reliability rewards x and wages wH ; wL satisfy the following conditions:
a) High is at least as well o¤ as Low. That is: wH + Hb  wL + x.
b) Low does not want to be independent. That is: wL + x > wH + Lb:
c) High exactly receives his reservation utility. That is: wH + Hb = u (H) :
d) Low earns a surplus over his reservation utility. That is: wL + x > u (L) :
(3) The manager never does better than if the market has symmetric information.
Proof of Proposition 8
To provide a better overview, the proof is divided into several steps.
Optimality of Lows strategy. Suppose that the market has the beliefs as stated, i.e., that L
will be reliable and H will be independent. Then, we require two similar but conceptually
distinct conditions for Low. First, we require him to be reliable rather than disloyal. By
being reliable, W knows that the market will believe him to be L; and, consistent with
equilibrium, it believes that it is optimal for M to consequently o¤er wage wL and reliability
rewards x. By contrast, independence allows the worker to convince the market that he is
H : Recall from the text that we assume that even though M knows that the worker is the
low type, in order to keep him inside the rm she would need to o¤er a wage wH forever.
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Low is not really a high type, though. Therefore, in spot interaction, he will expect to
earn Lb in side opportunities. In other words, incentive compatibility for Low, IC-L, under
which Low prefers reliability to independence holds if and only if
wL + x+

1   (wL + x)  wH + b+

1   (wH + Lb) : (47)
Second, Low must not have an incentive to renege, in addition to justmimicing. Using
the standard logic, we have for Lows non-reneging constraint, NR-L,
wL + x+

1   (wL + x)  wL + b+ x+

1   (wH + Lb) : (48)
Thus, a Low type knows that reneging on reliability (or choosing independence over relia-
bility) has two e¤ects: On the one hand, he is able to secure a higher wage. On the other
hand, he loses reliability rewards x. Both weigh more for incompetent guys, so it is a priori
unclear which e¤ect dominates. For separation to become possible we need to nd values of
x and the wages that are consistent with Ms optimizing behavior.
To do this, we begin by noting that an immediate implication of NR-L is wL + x 
wH + Lb; since 1  > 0: This proves part 2b. Moreover, we have the following relationship
between Lows two constraints.
Lemma 8.1 If Low does not renege on reliability, he chooses reliability from the beginning.
That is, NR-L implies IC-L.
Proof of Lemma 8.1
To see this, rewrite NR-L as
x  (wH   wL) + Lb+ b1  

:
Therefore, wL+ x > wH is guaranteed, which is a su¢ cient condition for IC-L to be implied
by NR-L. The intuition is clear: If Low does not even have an incentive to renege, he surely
does not have an incentive to choose independence from the beginning.
Optimality of Highs strategy. High needs to prefer independence in this candidate equi-
librium. But in fact M can always easily make that constraint hold. She can just never
reward reliability by High. In other words, she can just set rewards High gets for reliability
very small or negative. If instead IC-H does have to hold, and the rewards to reliability
are constrained to be the same for all types, a separating equilibrium may fail to exist. See
Proposition 8below.
Optimality of Ms strategy, part 1. Ms behavior also needs to obey a non-reneging
constraint of the usual form. The slight di¤erence to the constraint in the case where the
market knows the workers competence is that once M has reneged on her promise of rewards
for reliability and W is never reliable again, the market will believe that W is H ; thus forcing
M to pay wH : Therefore, Ms non-reneging constraint, NR-M, is
y + v   x  wL + 
1   [Ey + v   x  wL]  y + v   wL +

1   [Ey   wH ] (49)
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Rewriting the constraint yields
x   (wH   wL) + v: (50)
Thus, as before, the two non-reneging constraints NR-L and NR-M impose bounds on reli-
ability rewards. The lower bound is due to the Ws demands for rewards; the upper bound
is due to the lack of full commitment by M.
Utility levels. Intuitively, separation is meaningful if we can induce High and Low to
act according to the markets belief (and according to what M found optimal under perfect
information) but still retain Highs utility advantage. Indeed, we can show parts 2a and 2c
of the Proposition in the following
Lemma 8.2 High earns exactly his reservation utility and is better o¤ than Low. That is,
wH + Hb  wL + x:
Proof of Lemma 8.2
First, we can note that the wage M will pay High will be such that together with his side
opportunities, he exactly reaches his reservation utility. There would be no point in paying
more (nor less, because High would leave M). Thus, we know that
wH = u (H)  Hb (51)
which is part 2c of Proposition 8.
Second, making use of NR-L, we can substitute for the right side of the condition to be
shown in order to have
wH + Hb  wH + Lb+ b1  

: (52)
Rewriting, we get 
H   L   1  


b > 0 (53)
which always holds under our restrictions on parameters. Intuitively, what this condition
says is that the types we want to separate must not be too close,relative to a measure of
impatience.
Moreover, we can show that Low earns a surplus over his reservation wage (part 2d of
Proposition 8).
Lemma 8.3 Low earns a surplus over his reservation wage: wL + x  u (L) :
Proof of Lemma 8.3
To show this, we combine Lows NR with the insight that High earns exactly his reser-
vation wage. Formally,
wL + x  wH + Lb+ b1  

= u (H)  Hb+ Lb+ b1  

: (54)
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This term is greater than u (L) = Ly + (1  L)y, if and only if
(H   L) (y   b) + b1  

> 0: (55)
The assumed parameter restriction y b > 0 is therefore a su¢ cient condition for the Lemma
to hold.
Optimality of Ms strategy, part 2. Finally, we need to check whether M indeed wants
L to be reliable and H to be disloyal, i.e., whether Ws behavior and the markets beliefs are
consistent with optimizing behavior on Ms part. Employing the fact that wH = y+Hy 
Hb; we know that the low type, when he pretends to be H ; actually receives less utility
than a true high type, because he only realizes opportunities of expected value Lb. The
payo¤s to M are easily determined as follows:
UM (L is reliable) = v + b

H   L   1  


  (H   L)y (56)
UM (L is independent) = Hb  (H   L)y (57)
Thus, reliability is preferred for the low type if and only if
v > b

L +
1  


= xP (L) : (58)
Similarly,
UM (H is independent) = Hb (59)
UM (H is reliable) = v   b1  

: (60)
Thus, M wants the high type not to be reliable if and only if
v < b

H +
1  


= xP (H) : (61)
But these two conditions are precisely what it means for Highs reliability not to be worth
it under perfect information, but for Lows reliability to be worth it. In other words, if and
only if reliability pays under symmetric information, M is also able to nd a way to separate
High and Low in behavior when the market sends incentives to Low to mirror High. Ms
ability to do this derives endogenously from the tradeo¤ between competence and reliability.
However, M incurs extra costs in doing this to the extent that Low, by acting independently,
expects to be able to receive wH for an extended period of time.
This completes the proof of Proposition 8.
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Proposition 8Under the conditions of Proposition 8, a separating equilibrium with the
properties of the equilibrium in Proposition 8 exists also in the case where the manager is
asymmetrically informed about the workers competence.
Proof of Proposition 8
Consider now the case where M does not know Ws competence either. Even in this case,
M may use the sorting possibility presented to him in form of the competence-reliability
tradeo¤ to her advantage. One might think that separation now becomes more di¢ cult.
After all, recall that in the case so far we were able to avoid High envying Low because M
could simply give very negative rewards for reliability to High. But here, if M has to o¤er
two packages of compensation one with and one without reliability rewards High may
envy Low. Intuitively, the two packages must be su¢ ciently di¤erent for separation to be
possible, but if the types are too close to each other, this might not be possible. However,
this proof reveals that in fact the conditions for Proposition 8 are enough to allow us to
obtain separation even in this case. Similar conditions as in Proposition 8 need to hold
for Lows and Ms behavior. In addition, now High needs to prefer independence in this
candidate equilibrium. For High, there is no non-reneging constraint, because there is no
contract to renege on. His incentive-compatibility constraint, IC-H, is
wH + b+

1   (wH + Hb)  wL + x+

1   (wL + x) (62)
or
x  (wH   wL) + b (1  ) + Hb: (63)
Intuitively, if reliability rewards are too attractive, even high types choose reliability over
spot interaction. A necessary condition for both NR-L and IC-H to hold is that
H   L   + 1

  2  0 (64)
This condition can be written as
H >

1

  1 + L

  (1     H + H) : (65)
The term (1     H + H) is always positive. Therefore, if H >
 
1

  1 + L

; the
premise of Proposition 8, separation is also possible in the case where M does not know
the workers competence.
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